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vVn,LSON v. SUPERIOR COURT 
r46 C.2d 291; 294 P.2d 361 
lL. A. No. 23924. In Bank. Feb. 24, 
291 
l~'LOY WILLSON, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF' SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent. 
Arrest-Making Arrest.--,Vhere petitioner is shown to have 
been taken into custody while engaged in the commission of 
there is evidence that the requirements of Pen. 
§§ 835, relating to the manner of making an arrest, 
Id.-Making Arrest.-vVhcre it may be inferred from the fact 
petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made no 
outcry or objection, that she reali:ced that the arrt>sting 
oft1cer was a police offict>r whose purpose was to make an 
urrest, it is immaterial that petition£>r was not expressly in-
formed of the officer's authority and purpose. 
[3] Searches and Seizures-Time of Making.-If before a search 
and seizure the officer was justified in making an arrest, it is 
immaterial that the search and seizure preceded rather than 
followed the arrest. 
[4] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause.-Although in-
formation provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on 
the issue of reasonable cause for making an arrest, in the 
11hsence of some pressing emergency an arrest may not be 
hused solely on such information, and evidence must be pre-
sented to the court that would justify the conclusion that 
reliance on the information was reasonable. 
[5] Id.- Without Warrant- Reasonable Cause: Searches and 
Seizures-Justification for.-Although the fact that a police 
officer found petitioner in a bar near a telephone standing 
a scratch pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand 
and petitioner, when the officer asked to see what was in her 
attempted to conceal and dispose of it, would not con-
~titute reasonable cause to believe she was committing a 
such conduct was sufficient to justify the officer's re-
liance on information previously given her of petitioner's 
bookmaking, and under these circumstances the evidence be-
['ore the magistrate was sufficient to justify the conclusion that 
n violation of Pen. Codr, § 337a, had been committed, th11t 
Sec Cal.Jur., Arrest, § 21 et seq.; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 6.5 et seq. 
See Cal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Arrest, § 13; [3] Searches and 
§ 1; [ 4 J Arrest, § 12; [ 5 J Arrest, § 12; Searches and 
§1. 
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cause before the search and 
defendant was and that the 
and arrest were lawful. 
to restrain the Superior 
further in prose-
for Appellant. 
District Attorney (San Diego), and 
District Attorney, for Respondent. 
information petitioner Mona "Willson 
with one count of occupying premises for the 
purpose of horse-race bookmaking and one count of record-
bet on a horse race. (Pen. Code, § 337a, subds. 2, 4.) 
Her motion to set aside the information on the ground 
that there is no reasonable or probable cause to believe she 
committed the offenses eharged was denied (see Pen. Code, 
§ , and she now seeks prohibition to prevent further pro-
her. (See Pen. Code, § 999a.) 
Petitioner contends that her commitment was based en-
tirely on evidence and that the peremptory writ 
shoul<1 therefore issue. (See Rogers v. Superior Court, ante, 
pp. 3, 6, 7 P.2d 929].) 
At the hearing, San Diego Chief of Police 
Adam Jansen testified that on May 25th or 26th, 1955, a man 
stopped him in the hallway of the police station. The man 
appeared to know Chief Jansen, but Chief Jansen did not 
know him and did not find out who he was or where he lived. 
'l'he man told him that "there ·was a considerably large book 
operation in progress in the Monte Carlo bar .... 
He said he had been in the place; that he had observed it, 
and he described what the operation was." Part of the in-
formation concerned a ·waitress named Mona. 'rhe 
man said that she would generally be found near the telo 
that she occasionally answered it, and that she took 
bets from customers in the place. "He said that the girl 
Mona used food checks, restaurant checks. I gathered it was 
t11e tab that the waitress would make out when you 
were served food from the way he described it. She wrote 
the \Yagers on these slips, and that she had two pockets in 
her--he didn't say uniform, he said she had two pockets, 
one, I don't know which one, one contained money and the 
2D3 
was. 
substance of the information 
other officers 
in the company of three 
Monte Carlo bar during the afternoon of ,J nne 
purpose of the visit was to secure evidence of 
such evidence was found, to make arrests. On enter-
the bar, Officer Sunday observed at 
end of the bar. She ·was a belt with a metal 
that had the name "Mona" written on it. Ofllcer Sun-
testified that "She \Yas standing the and I 
her at that point. When I came up to [peti-
, I observed on the bar a telephone, a small scratch 
and a pencil. I stated to her--I noticed first that she 
had something in her hand, appeared to be papers. I asked 
her I may see IYhat was in her hand. And as I said that, 
these papers that were in her hand, she attempted to crumple 
and extended her hand to the baek and to the side of 
her.'' Officer Sunday totJk the papers from her hand and 
then searched petitioner's pockets. Three slips of paper ·were 
from petitioner's hand and another from he'' left 
and approximately $270 in cash was found in her 
other pocket. Officer Sunday then ash:ed petitioner to come 
and she and another officer took petitioner to the 
station. The officers were not in uniform and did not 
themselves as such or inform petitioner expressly 
that she was being arrested, and they did not have a search 
or a warrant for petitioner's arrest. There was evi-
that the slips were registered bets on horRe.s running 
ill races on the day that they were seized. 
Section 835 of the Penal Code provides that ''An arrest 
IS by an actual restraint of the person of the defendant, 
or his submission to the custody of an officer. The de-
fendant must not be subjected to any more restraint than 
ifl necessary for his arrest and detention." Section 841 pro-
Yides that ''The person making the arrest must inform the 
person to be arrested of tl1e intention to arrest him, of the 
cause of the arrest, and the authority to make it, except 
when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the 
commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, or is 
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pursued immediately after its commission, or after an escape.'' 
[1] Since petitioner was taken into custody while apparently 
engaged in the commission of an offense, there is evidence 
that the requirements of these sections were met. [2] More-
over, since petitioner was arrested in a public bar, but made 
no outcry or objection, it may be inferred that she realized 
that Officer Sunday was a police officer and that her purpose 
was to make an arrest. Under these circumstances, it is 
immaterial that petitioner was not expressly informed of 
Officer Sunday's authority and purpose. (See People v. 
Martin, 45 Cal.2d 755,762-763 [290 P.2d 855], and cases cited.) 
[3] Furthermore, if before the search and seizure, Officer 
Sunday was justified in making an arrest, it is also immaterial 
that the search and seizure preceded rather than followed 
the arrest. (People v. Simon, 45 Cal.2d 645, 648-649 [290 
P.2d 531] .) 
Defendant contends, however, that before the search and 
the arrest, Officer Sunday had no reasonable cause to believe 
she had committed or was committing a felony (Pen. Code, 
§ 836, subd. 3) and that the search and seizure were there-
fore unlawful. (See People v. Brown, 45 Cal.2d 640, 642-645 
[290 P.2d 528] ; People v. Simon, supra, 45 Cal.2d 645, 647-
648; People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d j52, 655 [290 P.2d 535] .) 
In People v. Boyles, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 [290 P.2d 535], 
we held that ''reasonable cause to justify an arrest may con-
sist of information obtained from others and is not limited 
to evidence that would be admissible at the trial on the issue 
of guilt." Accordingly, the question presented is whether 
the information given by the unidentified man to the chief 
of police and passed on to Officer Sunday was sufficient in 
the light of the other evidence to constitute reasonable cause 
to believe that defendant was guilty of a felony. [4] Although 
information provided by an anonymous informer is relevant 
on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some press-
ing emergency (see People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 92-93 
[37 P. 799, 43 Am.St.Rep. 73] ), an arrest may not be based 
solely on such information. (United States v. Kind, 87 F.2d 
315, 316; United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629; United 
States v. Keown, 19 F.Supp. 639, 646; State v. Arregui, 44 
Idaho 43 [254 P. 788, 793-794, 52 A.L.R. 463]; Hill v. State, 
151 Miss. 518 [118 So. 539, 540] ; Smith v. State, 169 
Tenn. 633 [90 S.W.2d 523, 524] ), and evidence must be 
presented to the court that would justify the conclusion 
that reliance on the information was reasonable. (See People 
WILLSON v. SUPERIOR CouRT 
[46 C.2d 291; 294 P.2d 36] 
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supra, 45 Cal.2d 652, 656 (290 P.2d 535] .) In 
cases the identity of, or past experience with, the in-
former may provide such evidence (see Aitken v. White, 93 
'"'L"'-"!J'-'·"'"' 134, 145 [208 P.2d 788]), * and in others it may 
i:!L<!JI#•~u by similar information from other sources or 
personal observations of the police. In the present 
the identity of the informer was unknown, the San Diego 
had had no previous experience with him indicating 
information was reliable, and the source and character 
other information with respect to bookmaking at the 
Carlo bar was not sufficiently revealed to permit its 
We must consider, therefore, whether the evidence 
Ahe'""'''"'n by Officer Sunday in the bar before the search was 
::>wlllv""'·'~ to justify her reliance on the information that she 
received. 
Petitioner was found in the bar near the telephone 
the informer had stated she would generally be. Since 
innocent conduct could be known, however, to anyone 
frequented the bar, it is doubtful whether its verification 
would justify reasonable reliance on the additional in-
lnr.t<l>LJluu charging petitioner with bookmaking. In addition, 
Officer Sunday observed petitioner standing by a 
pad and a pencil with slips of paper in her hand. 
'""'.,.,.<,.,..,. to Chief Jansen's assumption, the pad was not a 
of ordinary printed checks given to customers, but was 
a of plain scratch paper, and although such a pad would 
be commonplace equipment in an office (see People v. Banders, 
p. 247 [294 P.2d 10]), it is not ordinarily part of 
the equipment of a bar. Moreover, when Officer Sunday asked 
to see what was in petitioner's hand, she attempted to conceal 
and dispose of it. Although petitioner's conduct observed 
Officer Sunday in the bar would not of itself constitute 
reasonable cause to believe she was committing a felony, it 
was sufficient to justify Officer Sunday's reliance on the in-
formation given her of petitioner's bookmaking. Under these 
circumstances the evidence before the magistrate was sufficient 
to justify the conclusion that a violation of Penal Code, see-
*Since in the present ease Chief Jansen did not know the identity of 
the informer, no question is presented as to when, if ever, a claim of 
not to reveal the identity of an informer may defeat the right 
on his information in making an arrest or search. (See Scher v. 
States, 305 U.S. 251, 253-254 [59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151]; 
United States v. One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 F.2d 818, 820; Hi!Z v. 
supra, 151 Miss. 518 [118 So. 539, 540]; Smith v. State, supra, 
633 [90 S.W.2d 523, 524].) 
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that Officer Sunday had rea-
search and seizure to believe that 
and that therefore the search, 
were lawful. (See Husty v. United States, 
701 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629, 74 A.L.R 
One 1941 Oldsmobile Sedan, 158 
Wisniewski v. United 47 F.2d 825, 826; 
110 Tex.Crim. 646 [10 S.W.2d 725].) 
·writ of prohibition is discharged and the 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in People 
v. Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52], I am of 
the opinion that the search and seizure in tne case at bar 
was unreasonable and therefore illegal and that the evidence 
obtained thereby was inadmissible. Since the evidence so 
obtained was the only evidence which tended to support the 
charge against petitioner, it should follow that there was 
no reasonable or probable cause to believe that she had com-
mitted the offenses charged in the information and a writ 
of prohibition should issue to prevent further proceedings 
against her. 
